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Competition hinders the evolution of altruism amongst kin when beneficiaries gain at the expense of
competing relatives. Altruism is consequently deemed to require stronger kin selection, or trait-selected
synergies, or elastic population regulation, to counter this effect. Here we contest the view that competition
putsanysuchdemandsonaltruism.Inecologicallyrealisticscenarios,competitioninfluencesbothaltruism
and defection. We show how environments that pit defectors against each other allow strong altruism to
evolve even in populations with negligible kin structure and no synergies. Competition amongst defectors
presents relativeadvantagestoaltruisminthesimplestgames betweenaltruists anddefectors, andthemost
generic models of altruistic phenotypes or genotypes invading non-altruistic populations under inelastic
density regulation. Given the widespread inevitability of competition, selection will often favour altruism
because its alternatives provide lower fitness. Strong competition amongst defectors nevertheless
undermines altruism, by facilitating invasion of unrelated beneficiaries as parasites.
A
n act of strong altruism involves giving a fitness advantage to others at net personal cost to the bene-
factor
1,2. Strong altruism presents a special case in evolutionary biology because its cost to the altruist
appears to contradict the self-interested incentives of natural selection. Its resilience to defection despite
thecostisexplainedbytheindirectbenefitsthatreturntoanaltruistfrominteractionsthatarepositivelyassorted
bykinrecognition,populationviscosity,reciprocity,orother structuringmechanisms
3–5.Theevolutionofstrong
altruism is inhibited,however, whenthe very structures thatpromote indirect benefits alsopromote competition
amongstthebeneficiaries
6.Thisbenefits-cancellingeffectofcompetitionmaysustainonlyweakaltruism,without
net cost to the altruist, or suppress cooperation altogether
7. A challenge remains therefore to explain the wide-
spread occurrence of altruistic traits, and cooperative behaviours generally, in crowded environments
8–12.
Strong altruism occupies the 1/2 quartile of pairwise interaction space in the Hamiltonian classification
3,13
completed by 1/1 mutually beneficial (including weakly altruistic), 2/1 selfish, and 2/2 spiteful interactions.
The 1/2 interaction of strong altruism, henceforth referred to as ‘altruism’, can achieve an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS) when its beneficiaries are kin. Specifically, kin selection must satisfy Hamilton’s rule:
{czr:bw0, ð1Þ
in which the altruist’s net cost c to personal fitness in delivering fitness benefit b is compensated by beneficiaries
with coefficient of relatedness r returning inclusive fitness r?b to the altruist
3. Coefficient r quantifies the benefits
arising from positively assorted interactions. In pairwise interactions, assortative mixing is a necessary pre-
requisite for altruism by kin selection, and/or trait selection on synergistic benefits
4,14.
Altruism is inhibited when relatives compete for its benefits
6,8,15,16. Competition means that one individual’s
gain is another’s loss; competitive interactions amongst relatives therefore result in beneficiaries gaining from
altruismonlyattheexpenseofotherrelativesofthealtruist.Forexample,ifmutualaltruismraisespersonalfitness
in the form of b 2 c extra offspring, then their displacement of other relatives of the altruist by population
regulation incurs an inclusive fitness cost r9?(b 2 c), where r9 is the relatedness of those relatives to the altruist.
Hamilton’s rule can accommodate this supplementary cost by reconfiguring relatedness with respect to the
‘economic neighbourhood’ that encompasses competition with relatives, with a devaluation of r that has the
effect of inhibiting altruism
15. Unless r9,r, altruism is unsustainable with inelastic population regulation
8,16.
Recent life-cycle models have shown how elasticity in regulating mechanisms can offset this inhibitory effect of
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SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 3 : 2836 | DOI: 10.1038/srep02836 1competition, even to the extent that competition favours altruism
when it brings trait-selected synergistic benefits
11,12,17.
Even with elastic population regulation and synergistic benefits,
the requirement for strong population structure and/or positive
synergies to overcome inhibition by competition assumes that the
driverforaltruismisanopportunitytocollectthepositivebenefitsof
thealtruistic act.Inecologicallyrealisticscenariosofcrowding, how-
ever, the driver for altruism can be something altogether more
mundane and ubiquitous: release from competition amongst non-
altruists. Competition is widespread and largely inevitable in the
natural world, and conditions that provide positive synergies are
possibly too rare to explain the ubiquity of altruism. Here we contest
the prevailing view that altruism requires stronger kin or trait selec-
tion in crowded conditions, by showing that its models have yet to
embrace fully the evolutionary tenet that traits spread when their
carriers have higher fitness than the population average (even if the
trait carries no intrinsic benefit). Prior work on the evolution of
altruism has focused solely on the impacts of altruists on beneficiar-
ies, calibrating Hamilton’s rule against a non-altruism alternative of
nointeraction. Whilstthis alternativeisappropriate to density-inde-
pendent dynamics, it ignores a basic principle of population regu-
lation, that the payoff for mutual competition is negative relative to
no interaction.
We consider an environment in which competition lowers the
payoff for non-altruists with other non-altruists, as well as for altru-
ists with beneficiaries. For example cooperative hunting and breed-
ing in groups of African wild dogs (Lycaon pictus) brings fitness
benefits that may depend on prevailing conditions of competitor
density
18. The alternative to altruism amongst kin in this globally
competitive environment is competition amongst non-altruist
(‘defector’) kin. Their competition with each other presents a bleak
prospect against which altruism prevails relatively easily, even with
negligible population structure, and without requirement for r9,r,
orelasticregulation,orsynergisticbenefits.Wefindthatcompetitive
environments facilitate altruism by devaluing its alternatives, as
opposed to improving its opportunity. This prediction is consistent
withtheobservationinwilddogsthatgroupsizeincreasesindividual
fitness more strongly under higher competitor density
18. We dem-
onstrate the broad scope of our theoretical analysis by modelling it
with the simplest games between altruist and defector strategies, and
the most generic dynamics of altruistic phenotypes and genotypes
invading a density-regulated population of non-altruists. These
games and models underpin understanding of all empirical cases
of cooperative behaviours amongst taxa ranging from bacteria to
vertebrates, and we point to examples of both conferred benefits
and public goods benefits. We discuss the reasons why density regu-
lation amongst non-altruists has been ignored in previous theory of
altruism in the presence of competition.
We start with a conventional Prisoner’s Dilemma game, in which
unilateral defection pays better than mutual altruism and mutual
defection pays better than unilateral altruism. We interpret its pair-
wiseinteractions asproducts ofdensity-dependent competition, and
we analyse the inclusive fitness required to escape the dilemma. We
then model the influence of interactions amongst defectors on the
threshold of relatedness necessary for an ESS with altruism, always
assuming a Prisoner’s Dilemma for personal fitness. Our method
aligns with recent life-cycle models in recognizing that competition
and inclusive fitness have independent causal factors, of resource
limitation and population structure respectively
11,12. Accordingly,
wedecoupletheeffects ofcompetitionfromthoseofinclusivefitness
by allocating all competitive effects to payoffs in personal fitness.
Inclusive fitness is then calculated on payoffs resulting from interac-
tions that include competition, instead of being calculated as a sup-
plement to pre-competition inclusive fitness. This approach greatly
simplifies accounting procedures by obviating the need to specially
addthe effects of competition into the inclusive fitness payoffs. Thus
we treat the change in personal fitness b 2 c for mutual altruism as
the average payoff obtained in the presence of competition amongst
altruistsselectedwithaveragerelatednessr.Competitionmayrender
b 2 c negative relative to no interaction, and we consider both pos-
itive and negative scenarios. Model predictions depart from those of
previous theory only when we factor in the presence of competition
to the payoff for mutual defection. Competition renders this payoff
negative relative to no interaction, and we therefore refer to it as a
fitness cost d (see ref. 19 for discussion of such costs generally). We
will demonstrate that this method of accounting for competition
perfectlymapsthegame-theoreticpayoffsontoLotka-Volterrainter-
action coefficients for density-dependent population dynamics.
Results
Altruism in a competitive environment. Altruists escape the
Prisoner’s Dilemma by kin selection returning an inclusive fitness
payoffS
itothealtruistinteracting withadefector,whichexceeds the
payoff P
i to a defector with another defector. Table 1 shows how the
conventional application of Hamilton’s rule with P 5 P
i 5 0
requires: S 1 r?b . 0, where payoff S accounts for the net personal
cost to the altruist in accordance with condition (1). The value of S
depends on whether the altruism involves conferring a benefit at net
cost c (Table 1a) or manufacturing a public good at net cost c 2 b
(Table 1b). Figure 1 illustrates Hamilton’s model schematically for
both these types of altruism in the two-player case.
We now build ecological realism into the game by giving the
interaction between non-altruists a personal cost d, setting P 5
2d. The condition S
i . P
i for an ESS with altruism then requires
a generalized form of Hamilton’s rule:
{ net personal cost to altruist fg
zr: net personal benefit to beneficiary fg w0:
ð2Þ
Thepresenceofpersonalcostdlowersthethresholdofcondition(2),
thereby favouring persistence of altruism. Depending on the type of
interaction expressed by d, its associated inclusive fitness payoff P
i
either increments the inclusive fitness benefit to each altruist or it
decrements their net personal cost. Figure 2 illustrates schematically
the derivations of P
i given P 52 d that define alternative formula-
tions of Hamilton’s rule. If d accounts for a competitive impact of
actor on recipient, such as displacement, then P
i 5 r?P (Fig. 2a).
Consequently, the condition S
i . P
i for an ESS with altruism in
the presence of mutual displacement amongst non-altruists requires
Szr: bzd ðÞ w0: ð3Þ
In effect, competition cost d supplements the net personal benefit of
altruism to the beneficiary that contributes to inclusive fitness of the
altruist. Alternatively, if d accounts for a competitive impact on the
Table 1 | Matrix of payoffs for two-strategy games with 1/2
unilateral payoffs (T . 0 . S)
Cooperator Defector
(a) Conferral of benefit b at net cost c
Cooperator R 52 c 1 b, S 52 c,
R
i 5 R 2 T 1 r?bS
i 5 S 1 r?b
Defector T 5 b, P,
T
i 5 0 P
i
(b) Manufacture of public good b at net cost c 2 b . 0
Cooperator R 52 c/2 1 b, S 5 –(c – b),
R
i 5 R – T 1 r?bS
i 5 S 1 r?b
Defector T 5 b, P,
T
i 5 0 P
i
Eachcellshowsthepayofftotherowstrategyforitsinteractionwiththecolumnstrategy,expressed
as personal fitness (R, S, T, P), and as inclusive fitness (R
i, S
i, T
i, P
i) given average relatedness r.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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i 5 P (Fig. 2b).
Consequently, S
i . P
i given mutual retreat amongst non-altruists
requires
Szdzr:dw0: ð4Þ
In effect, competition cost d subtracts from the net personal cost of
altruism. Whichever the circumstance, costly altruism is more easily
favoured when set against costly interactions amongst non-altruists.
Invasion of altruism into a population of non-altruists. Where
payoffs have an ESS outcome in relative frequencies of two
strategies (as opposed to a Nash equilibrium in relative probability
of each strategy for two players), Lotka-Volterra population
dynamics set criteria for ESS outcomes that are identical to those
oftwoplayers,asdescribedintheMethods.Amorecostlyinteraction
amongst Defectors, and therefore more negative payoff P 52 d,
facilitates invasion by a Cooperator phenotype or genotype into a
density-regulated population. Exactly as for two-player games, the
condition S
i . P
i for escaping a Prisoner’s Dilemma has alternative
constructions depending on the derivation of d. Condition (3)
applies if d accounts for displacement; condition (4) applies if d
accounts for retreat. At the population level, the displacement
effect of d may be expressed by raised adult mortality and retreat
by inhibited recruitment (fecundity or juvenile survival).
BeyondtheparticularcontextofthePrisoner’sDilemmagame,the
same predictions arise in a standard derivation of Hamilton’s rule
from a positive selection gradient. A population is susceptible to
invasion by altruism given a positive difference between the fitness
of carriers of the altruism allele and the fitness of those carrying an
alternative defector allele: W(altruist) 2 W(defector) . 0. For
example, if competition expresses retreat, and w0 is the unavailable
intrinsic fitness before any density-dependent interactions, the fit-
ness equations are:
W altruist ðÞ ~w0{czEpaltruist j ½  :b
W defector ðÞ ~w0{dzEpdefector j ½  :b
ð5Þ
wherepistherelativefrequencyofcooperatorsamongstinteractions
withthefocalindividual.Theinvasionconditionistherefore:2c1d
1 r?b . 0, which is condition (4) above with explicitly defined r 5
E[pjaltruist] 2 E[pjdefector]. A value of d 5 0 returns Hamilton’s
rule in the conventional form of condition (1). A value of d . 0
simply recognizes that density-dependent competition does not
allow individuals to avoid interacting with each other, meaning that
W(defector) 5 w0 is not an option in the absence of altruism.
Likewise for competition expressed by displacement, in the light of
Fig. 2 the fitness equations are:
W altruist ðÞ ~w0{czEpaltruist j ½  : bzd ðÞ
W defector ðÞ ~w0zEpdefector j ½  : bzd ðÞ
ð6Þ
andtheinvasionconditionistherefore:2c1r?(b1d).0,whichis
condition (3) above.
Altruism with negligible assortment of interactions. For two-
player probabilities and for population-level frequencies alike, a
mixed ESS is possible even with r 5 0 provided only that S . P
(i.e., d . c for a conferred benefit, or d . c 2 b for a public good).
The 1/2 interaction thereby sustained without assortative mixing
cannot be classified as altruism because it cannot be driven by the
benefactor. Rather, it is a parasite-host interaction driven by the
beneficiary acting as a parasite (as described in the Methods).
What distinguishes an altruist from a victim-host is its 1/2
interaction being sustainable only in the presence of assortative
mixing (i.e., S
i . P
i despite P $ S). Accordingly, conventional
formulations of Hamilton’s rule with d 5 0 find that altruism with
higher cost relative to benefit requires stronger kin selection.
Altruismhasnosuchdependencyonr,however,inthepresenceof
a cost d for mutual defection. Figure 3 illustrates the thresholds of
conditions (3) and (4) (dashed and solid lines respectively) to show
how d . 0 sustains higher-cost and lower-benefit altruism, and with
a declining threshold of r for larger d. Token levels of assortative
mixing sustain even the most costly altruism, given sufficiently large
cost d in competition by mutual retreat amongst non-altruists.
Consider an example of public-good manufacture with b 5 0.4
and c 5 0.6 (which sets S 52 0.2). In the absence of competition,
the altruist achieves an ESS only if kin selection exceeds full-sib
relatedness (r . 0.5). In the presence of Defector-on-Defector com-
petition, however, Fig. 3a shows that kin selection need only exceed
full cousin relatedness (r . 0.125) to sustain altruism if retreat d 5
0.15, and it needs only token relatedness if retreat d 5 0.2. Consider
an alternative example of a conferred benefit b. In the absence of
competition, no amount of relatedness can sustain it when the altru-
ist incurs cost c 5 b. In the presence of Defector-on-Defector com-
petition, however, Fig. 3b shows that kin selection need only exceed
half-sibrelatedness(r.0.25)tosustainaltruismwhenbandc50.4
Cooperator  Defector 
T  S 
Cooperator  Cooperator 
T  R-T 
T  R-T 
(a)
(b)
Figure 1 | Hamilton’s inclusive-fitness model applied to pairwise
interactions. (a) Cooperator-Defector and (b) Cooperator-Cooperator,
following the schema of ref. 25. Given players of equal fitness before
interacting (squares), each interaction (dashed connector) has payoffs for
actor(triangle)andrecipient(circle)that takeTable1aparametersforbas
a conferred benefit, and Table 1b parameters for b as a public good. The
inclusivefitnesspayoffforeachplayeristhesummedeffectofitsactionson
itself plus the effect of its actions on others weighted by relatedness r
24.
Defector  Defector 
P 
Defector  Defector 
P 
P 
P 
(a)
(b)
Figure 2 | Alternative types of Defector-on-Defector interaction with
payoff P 52 d. Schema as for Fig. 1. (a) Mutual displacement (i.e., each
intruding on the other, for example animals intruding into each other’s
territories or plants encroaching on each other’s canopies or at the
population level any rise in mortality resulting from resource
competition), setting inclusive fitness P
i 5 r?P. (b) Mutual retreat (i.e.,
each withdrawing away from the other, for example animals avoiding
conflict or at the population level any reduction in fecundity by an animal
or plant resulting from resource limitation), setting P
i 5 P.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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retreat d 5 0.4.
Strong competition amongst Defectors nevertheless threatens
altruism with invasion of beneficiaries as parasites of benefactors.
The 1/2 interaction takes on the character of a parasite-host rela-
tionship upon meeting the condition S . P. The Fig. 3 open circles
mark the cusp of an altruist’s beneficiary functioning as a parasite.
For competition expressed by mutual retreat, the condition is not
met until r 5 0 meaning that this kind of competition benefits
altruism at all levels of relatedness. Competition by mutual displace-
ment, however, benefits altruism only at higher levels of relatedness,
before the altruism gives way to parasitism. Appendix S1 in the
SupportingInformationcontains agraphicalspread-sheetcalculator
for enumerating ESS outcomes of conditions (3) and (4) for any
specified fitness payoffs and r.
Discussion
For two players and for population dynamics of two phenotypes and
two genotypes alike, a Cooperator that persists by virtue of personal
fitness S . P will function as a host to a parasitic Defector genotype
that sustains the ESS without assortative mixing
19. It belongs to the
1/2 parasite-host quartile of pairwise interaction space in the
Lidickerian classification
20 completed by 1/1 mutualistic, 2/1
host-parasite, and 2/2 competitor interactions. Here we have
extended game theory to address the domain between conventional
altruism and parasitism, respectively bounded in Fig. 3 by d 5 0i n
the Hamiltonian classification and by r 5 0 in the Lidickerian clas-
sification. The unifying framework has allowed us to re-evaluate the
conditions in which altruism can invade a competitive environment
of non-altruists. Our findings give a new perspective to the well-
established and tested prediction that competition amongst altruists
inhibits the evolution of altruism
6,8,15,16. The competitive impact that
is conventionally modelled as suppressing the inclusive fitness ben-
efits of altruism is easily offset by competition amongst non-altruists
diminishing the benefits of defection. Strong altruism consequently
requires little population structure in the presence of competition.
All of social evolution theory is underpinned by the principle that
populationstructureexplainsaltruism,andourstudydowngradesits
influence.
Wehavedefinedthebenefitbandcostcofstrongaltruismasbeing
the positive and negative payoffs observed in the presence of com-
petition. In principle, it might seem desirable to exclude from c any
fraction that is imposed by competition, in order to count only the
amount owing to adaptations that evolved for the purpose of pro-
viding benefit to others
2. A model for altruism in competitive envir-
onments could be constructed this way, for example bysubtracting a
constant d from all interactions in the Table 1 payoff matrix. This
would change the interpretation quantitatively, but notqualitatively.
It would explain the persistence of high-cost altruism with little
assortmentofinteractionsintermsofacostthatmostlyderivesfrom
competitive impact. The small portion of the benefactor’s cost of
interaction that is not due to competition (the altruistic part) would
then be sustained according to Hamilton’s rule, in the conventional
formofcondition(1)ratherthantheexpandedformofcondition(2).
We have chosen not to construct our models in this way, because
todosopresupposesthatitispossibletoseparatethecostofaltruism
from the cost of competition. We doubt that they can be separated
eitherinprincipleorinpractice.Preciselyhowanegativepayofftoan
altruist partitions into components due to altruism only and com-
petition only is a matter determined by evolutionary history that
cannotbeassessedmerelybyestablishingthatthealtruistnowincurs
a negative payoff. Moreover, the presence of altruism and the pres-
ence of competition may now be interdependent, making it imposs-
ible to separate them experimentally. We find it more informative to
interpretbandcasbenefits andcostsinthepresence ofcompetition,
because these are the directly observable fitness consequences of the
interaction between benefactor and beneficiary. Furthermore, the
directtranslationofthisinterpretationintoLotka-Volterradynamics
(detailed in the Methods) facilitates the distinction of altruism from
parasitism and other forms of competition
19. With this broader def-
initionofthenetpersonalbenefitandcostofanaltruisticinteraction,
a strongly negative payoff S is explained in terms of high-cost altru-
ism being more easily favoured when set against costly interactions
amongst non-altruists. Ref. 21 describes an empirical example con-
sistent with such an interpretation, in which competition within and
between termite species promotes cooperation by exacerbating the
impact of internal conflicts.
We suggest that the altruism we see in nature may often result, in
largepart, from the average fitness of non-altruists beingdiminished
by competition, and in that case, the conditions necessary to sustain
it are broad and do not require strong kin selection. We suspect that
manynaturalenvironmentspresentvariableconditionsforaltruism,
depending on current resource availability and threats to the integ-
rity of altruism from parasitism. An altruistic net-cost transferral of
fitness can degenerate into a parasitic transferral of identical mag-
nitude (i.e., same S and T) solely upon a reduction in P sufficient to
cross the threshold S . P. Empirical studies of cooperation face a
further substantial challenge in reliably distinguishing strong altru-
ism, motivated by the benefactor and sustained by indirect benefits,
from parasitism, motivated and sustained by the beneficiary
19.
Life-cyclemodelsofsynergistic altruismhaverecently shownhow
competition favours altruistic traits that create population elasticity,
for example by increasing growth yield
11, or carrying capacity
17. The
presence of costs to defecting from altruism, as modelled here, will
Figure 3 | Threshold relatedness r above which the ESS supports
altruism. AnaltruistincursapayoffS,0toitselfingivingbenefitb50.4
to another, here showing alternative S 52 0.1, 20.2 … 21.3 (lines left to
right in each colour). For any given S, the graph shows that the threshold r
declines with higher competition cost d of mutual defection, whether
competition expresses displacement (dashed orange lines, condition (3))
or retreat (solid blue lines, condition (4)); open circles mark the point on
eachlinebeyondwhichaltruismgiveswaytoparasitism,byvirtueofS.P.
Green region sustains altruism with displacement or retreat competition,
blueregionsustainsaltruismwithretreatonly.(a)Retreatd50.15sustains
acts of altruism with S 52 0.2 (i.e., net personal cost of c 5 0.2 for a
conferred benefit, or c 5 0.6 for a public good) amongst relatives with r .
0.125; (b) retreat d 5 0.3 sustains altruism with S 52 0.4 (i.e., conferred c
5 0.4, or public good c 5 0.8) amongst relatives with r . 0.25.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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for altruism. Given the evident prevalence of such costs of defection
under density regulation, their influence on the threshold of related-
ness that sustains altruism begs an empirical evaluation. We are not
aware of explicit tests to date, and we thus conclude with a disjunc-
tion. If conditions more commonly present altruists that are advan-
taged by synergies, then conventional analyses depending on highly
assorted interactions will have most relevance. However, if condi-
tions more commonly present non-altruists as being disadvantaged
by competition, the new analysis shows that high assortment will
have less relevance for sustaining altruism.
Thedecouplingofcompetitionfrominclusivefitnesshasalloweda
novel mapping of Hamilton’s rule with Lotka-Volterra population
dynamics, within the unifying framework of game theory for pair-
wise interactions. A correct interpretation requires acknowledging
that cooperative interactions such as altruism which are normally
associated with social games can apply also to conflict games for
unsocialsettingssuchasdensity-dependentcompetition.Thesimple
switchfrom P$ 0 forsocial games toP , 0for conflictgames opens
game-theoretic applications of evolutionary biology to the full spec-
trum of possibilities for 1/2 interactions. These range from
Hamiltonian altruism without competition through to high-cost
and low-benefit altruism enabled by negligible assortment of com-
petitors, and ultimately into victims of parasitism.
Methods
Prisoner’s Dilemma and related two-strategy games. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
encapsulatestheproblemthataltruismisnotastableoutcomeamongstfreelymixing
interactions. Consider a Cooperator strategy that confers fitness benefit b on another
at net cost c to the benefactor, and its interaction with a non-reciprocating Defector
strategy. The Cooperator’s altruism might take the form of helping another to raise
offspring at a cost to its own reproduction. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game allocates
percapitafitnesspayoffsforunilateral(cross-strategy)interactionsas‘Sucker’S52c
to a Cooperator with a Defector, and ‘Temptation’ T 5 b to a Defector with a
Cooperator,andpercapitafitnesspayoffsformutualinteractionsas‘Reward’R52c
1 b to a Cooperator with a Cooperator, and ‘Penalty’ P 5 0 to a Defector with a
Defector
22. Unilateral defection then pays better than mutual cooperation (T . R),
and mutual defection pays better than unilateral cooperation (P . S). Regardless of
starting strategies, the stable outcome is therefore mutual defection, despite its lower
payoff than that for mutual cooperation (R . P).
Amongst all possible two-strategy games, the Prisoner’s Dilemma belongs to the
classofgameswithapureESSoutcomeofDefectorsonly,whichissetbyT.RandP
$S
19,23.ThePrisoner’sDilemmaisopposedbytheHarmonyGame,whichbelongsto
the class with a pure ESS outcome of Cooperators only, set by R $ T and S . P.
Between these two extremes, a Stag-Hunt game belongs to the class with bi-stability,
which is set by R $ T and P $ S. Alternatively, the Hawk-Dove or Snowdrift game
belongstotheclasswithamixedESSoutcomeofCooperatorsandDefectors,whichis
setbyT.RandS.P.TheequilibriumprobabilityofbeingaCooperatoristhen(S2
P)/(S2P1T2R),andthealternativeprobabilityofbeingaDefectoris(T2R)/(S2
P 1 T 2 R)
23.
Apportioning inclusive fitness in two-strategy two-player games. An altruist
escapes the Prisoner’s Dilemma when positively assorted interactions give it indirect
fitness benefits sufficient to cancel its direct net cost c. The positive assortment is
quantified by the coefficient of relatedness r, which measures the component of
relatedness resulting from assortative mixing. This is given by the average covariance
in the identities of the interacting pair relative to the average covariance without
assortment
24,25.
Table 1 shows how relatedness can change the game outcome from an ESS of pure
defectiontoanESSwithcooperation.Thishappenswhentheinclusivefitnesspayoffs
break at least one of the conditions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma by achieving S
i . P
i,
despitehavingpersonalfitnesspayoffsP$S.InTable1awithP5P
i50,aninclusive
fitness benefit r?b that more than cancels a net personal fitness cost c changes the
game,inaccordancewithHamilton’srule(condition(1)).ThePrisoner’sDilemmain
personal payoffs then becomes a Harmony Game with a pure-strategy ESS of mutual
cooperation, by virtue of inclusive fitness meeting both defining conditions of this
alternative game: S
i . P
i and R
i $ T
i.
Table1bshowsthecriteriaappliedtomanufactureofapublicgood,whichbenefits
both parties, as opposed to conferral of a benefit only on the recipient. For example,
some bacterial cells manufacture polymers for the production of an extracellular
matrix of ‘biofilm’, which others may also use as a refuge
22. Again, players escape the
Prisoner’sDilemma onHamilton’srule fortheinclusivefitnessbenefitr?bmorethan
cancelling the net personal fitness cost c 2 b of its manufacture.
Phenotypic altruist invading a density-regulated population. The rate of change
over continuous time in relative frequencies xC and xD of Cooperator and Defector
phenotypes in a large population has 1-dimensional Lotka-Volterra dynamics:
_ y~y: S{P ðÞ z R{T ðÞ :y ½  , ð7Þ
where y 5xC/xD
19,26. A Cooperator strategy invades the population on condition S .
P, whereupon its ratio with a Defector strategy grows logistically to equilibrium y* 5
(S 2 P)/(T 2 R) on condition T . R, or it excludes the Defector if R $ T. These
conditions for Cooperator invasion align precisely with those of two players for the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (no invasion), Stag-Hunt (bi-stability), Harmony Game
(displacement of Defectors), and Hawk-Dove or Snowdrift game (coexistence).
Withpayoffs S, T and R set by c and b according to Table 1, Cooperator invasion is
facilitated by smaller P, due for example to competition amongst Defectors. If P , 0,
CooperatorsthatmeettheinvasioncriterionintermsofpersonalfitnessS.P,willbe
hoststoDefectorparasitesthatsustaintheESSwithoutassortativemixing,inaHawk-
Dove contest or Snowdrift game
19,23. Although a host has benefit extracted from it by
others, it reduces the cost to itself if it can limit the interaction to kin, for example by
limiting dispersal (a form of ‘social niche construction’
27,28). A host that manages in
thiswaytorecoupsomeindirectbenefittoitselfactsasan‘incidentalaltruist’,withits
altruism being incidental to the 1/2 interaction enforced by parasitism
19. Our focus
inthisanalysisisonthealternativescenario,ofa1/2interactionthatissustainedby
altruism (i.e., not by parasitism). Cooperators will equilibrate to an ESS that is sus-
tainedbyaltruismiftheymeettheinvasionconditiononlyintermsofinclusivefitness
S
i . P
i (while P $ S). We analyse this condition in the Results section.
The population dynamics of equation (7) accommodate the known inhibitory
effect of competition between altruists
6,8,15. A low or negative value of R expresses the
inhibition, just as a negative value of P expresses competition between non-altruists.
AlowervalueofRbringsalowerequilibriumfrequencyofaltruists(ifP$S),orhosts
toparasitism(ifS.P).Thecompetition betweenaltruistsmaybeoffset,however,by
synergies in mutual cooperation
11,14. Synergies may increase growth yield, for
examplewhenwolvesreducetheirindividualhuntingcostsbypack-huntingpreythat
are larger than the sum of individually hunted prey. Synergies can also raise carrying
capacity, for example when bacteria manufacture polymers for biofilm production.
These examples count as synergies if the mutual helping raises R above its Table 1
valueassetbycandbinthepresenceofcompetition.Thesynergycanbeenumerated
as a supplement a to the R payoff in Table 1, for the added value of the synergy to
personal fitness. Mutual interactions then involve strong altruism only if c . a;
otherwisewitha$cthegamehasapureESSofCooperatorswithmutualinteractions
that incur no net cost to the actor.
Genotypic altruist invading a density-regulated population. The same boundary
conditionsapplyalsototwocompetingpopulationsofindependently self-replicating
genotypes. These might be two strains of bacteria, for example, only one of which
manufactures polymers for the formation of a biofilm that provides refuge to both
22.
The rate of change over continuous time in ni individuals of population i has 2-
dimensional Lotka-Volterra dynamics:
_ ni~ni: 1z aij:njzaii:ni
 
ki

, ð8Þ
where aij is the per capita impact on genotype i from genotype j, relative to i on itself:
aii521;kiisthecarryingcapacityofgenotypeiintheabsenceoftheothergenotype;
and the genotype-i specific timescale is normalized against its per capita rate of
increase before any competition
19,26.
This conventional Lotka-Volterra model for competing populations translates
directly to game-theoretic terms for Cooperator and Defector genotypes as:
_ nC~nC: 1zS:nDzR:nC ½  , _ nD~nD: 1zT:nCzP:nD ½  , ð9Þ
where S 5 aCD/kC, R 5 aCC/kC, T 5 aDC/kD, P 5 aDD/kD. At the stable equilibrium
nC* and nD* of equations (9), nC* . 0 requires S . P, and nD* . 0 requires T . R,
just as for phenotype invasions (though achieved by 2-dimensional instead of 1-
dimensional dynamics
19). Note that the normalized coefficients aCC and aDD for
population regulating competition within each genotype force R and P negative. A
Cooperator genotype with 1/2 interaction set by T . 0 . S may yet invade a
Defector population, with the invasion facilitated by kC . kD which sets R . P.I n
effect, the Cooperator’s intrinsic efficiency in resource utilization offsets its costly
interaction with the Defector genotype.
Cooperators achieve an ESS with altruism when they meet the invasion condition
only in terms of inclusive fitness: S
i . P
i (i.e., while P $ S). The coefficient of
relatedness r that makes this possible quantifies the assortment of interactions with a
Defector genotype that brings indirect benefits to an altruistic Cooperator’s off-
spring
29.
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ERRATUM: Competitive environments sustain costly altruism with negligible
assortment of interactions
C. Patrick Doncaster, Adam Jackson & Richard A. Watson
This Article contains typographical errors in Condition (4).
Condition (4) should read: S 1 d 1 r?b . 0.
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